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Literature regarding the consequences of corruption on economic growth have been 
relying on official macroeconomic indicators which is vulnerable to potential manipulation 
attempts by governments. This thesis aims to explore potential use of satellite night lights data 
in analysis of relationship between corruption and economic growth in post-Soviet region for 
the period 1995–2013. Empirical analysis makes use of several datasets, such as, lights-output 
proxy Z was generated using the National Geophysical Data Center data; Corruption 
Perceptions Index from Transparency International and V-Dem corruption index from 
Varieties of Democracy Dataset. Results of the generalized method of moments estimation on 
the panel data of 14 countries show that corruption has a significant negative effect on the 
growth rate of lights-output proxy Z and on the growth rate of real GDP per capita. This effect 
is non-linear and lights-output proxy Z demonstrated higher impact of corruption on economic 
growth as compared to the models using GDP measure, that can be explained by evidence on 
data reliability, manipulation of macroeconomic statistics and regime type of a country. 
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In 2016, the World Bank estimated the cost of corruption at over US$2.6 trillion, 
equivalent to 5% of global domestic product (GDP). Transparency International, which aims 
to give a voice to victims of corruption, points out that two out of five business executives pay 
bribes at some point when dealing with public institutions in developing countries (Ribeiro et 
al., 2018) 
Corruption is a complex phenomenon that has been studied by several scholars to better 
understand it. The corruption literature branch has demonstrated the detrimental effect of 
corruption on economic growth, although this relationship is non- linear and with many caveats 
(Bardhan, 1997; Mauro, 1995). A critical factor in explaining different levels of corruption has 
been economic development, particularly income levels, measured in Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) per capita variations. Authors have claimed that across countries, higher per capita 
income correlates with lower levels of corruption, although some researchers have questioned 
this correlation (Kaufmann, 1999), and several scholars have discovered the opposite. (Braun 
and Di Tella, 2004; Frechette, 2001). Numerous studies which investigated the link between 
economic growth and corruption, have exploited macroeconomic indicators and statistics 
reported by governments and/or international organizations. However, emerging studies 
indicate that these macroeconomic indicators and figures are not entirely reliable. For example, 
Martinez (2017) discovered the manipulation of GDP growth statistics in non-democracies by 
comparing self-reported GDP figures using night-light data.  
Accordingly, existing research examining the link between corruption and economic 
growth would have own shortcomings due to data reliability issues, in particular, 
macroeconomic indicators. To overcome reliability and potentially manipulated data concerns, 
economists have proposed an alternative economic growth measure. For example, Henderson 
et al. (2012) used changes in night-light data as a measure of economic growth. They showed 
that light growth is a suitable proxy for GDP growth in the long run and also tracks short-term 
growth fluctuations. Rangel-Gonzalez and Llamosas-Rosas (2019) used satellite night-light 
data to measure economic activity in Mexico and discrepancies between estimated and official 
GDP to identify the unregistered economic activity. Therefore, this thesis aims to explore 
potential use of night light data to predict the relationship between corruption and economic 
growth. In this way, main advantage of use of satellite date, since the economic growth data 




important novelty and approach in the literature which studies the link between it and 
corruption.  
The main focus of this research will be to examine the relationship between corruption 
and economic growth in a Post-Soviet region using satellite night-light data. The motivation 
behind the selection of countries is the limitation of obtaining a large amount of satellite data, 
so it was decided to conduct the estimations with a limited number of countries. The 
geographical coverage of the analysis is the former Soviet Union (FSU) countries with the 
exception of Russia due to its large area and high regional variation in terms of economic 
development. This region is highly relevant for the study of corruption and its consequences 
on economy for several reasons. First, according to corruption indices from Transparency 
International, corruption is a widespread problem in this group of countries. Second, according 
to The Quality of Government ranking (Charron et al., 2019), these countries have low levels 
of institutional quality such as rule of law, accountability, and transparency. 
The thesis will be focused on examination of the effect of corruption on the rate of 
growth of lights-output proxy. I find that the direct effect of corruption on the rate of growth 
of generated lights- output proxy is statistically significant and that the effect is non-linear. 
Moreover, this effect is higher compared to the classical approach that uses GDP data.   
To the best of the author's knowledge, this is the first study for the FSU region that 
systematically analyzes the relationship between corruption and economic growth. In this 
sense, this thesis also adds to the limited literature by estimating the effect of corruption of that 
sample of countries and comparing official GDP growth rates with the generated proxy. 
The next chapter of the thesis reviews the relevant literature. It is followed by the “Data 
description” section, where night-lights and estimation data explained that used to conduct the 
research. The section “Methodology and empirical estimation” consist of several sub-sections: 
methodology behind the generation of lights-output output proxy; methodology of estimation 
of the impact of corruption on that proxy using generalized method of moments (GMM) 
approach; robustness checks; empirical results and their discussion. Eventually, Conclusion, 





2. Literature Review 
2.1. Measurement of corruption and its link with economic growth 
 
The role of corruption, the abuse of public office for private gain, in limiting human 
development is now well established. However, the ability to validly and reliably measure the 
impact of corruption over time and across countries remains controversial. A definition of 
corruption that was introduced by Pope (2000) and then popularized by the World Bank and 
the IMF, namely "the abuse of public office for private gains," serves as a backdrop of my 
research. 
As mentioned earlier, there are a variety of measurement tools for corruption. Hamilton 
and Hammer (2018) and Clark (2017) critically reviewed the validity, consistency, and content 
alignment of the six leading indicators used to measure corruption: including the two most 
popular: the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) and the Control of Corruption Governance 
Metric (CC). The authors made a comparative analysis between these and the other four, 
including the Government Effectiveness Governance Metric, the Global Corruption 
Barometer, the UN Survey of Crime Trends; and evidence on the measuring corruption 
(validity criterion). The result of the analysis is that these two composite subjective indicators 
are the best starting point for any empirical analysis because they are more comprehensive and 
thus more likely to capture all elements of corruption. 
The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is a freely available and cross-national 
measure of corruption from Transparency International. This index aims to measure the abuse 
of 'entrusted power for private gain' (Transparency International, 2011). Each country is given 
a score, which can range from 0 (extremely corrupt) to 100 (no corruption), and individual 
country scores are developed by aggregating and averaging normalized scores of 'corruption-
related data' emanating from a variety of sources. The objective of the index is to provide a 
measure of the extent of corruption by bureaucrats and politicians in the public sector 
(Transparency International, 2011). The goal of the Control of Corruption Governance Metric 
(CC) measure, like the CPI, is to capture the extent to which public policymakers abuse their 
public office for private gain. The aim of the index is designed to capture the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, including both small and large forms of corruption, 
as well as the "capture" of the state by elites and private interests (World Bank, 2010). Despite 
a formal definition that seems more focused on political corruption, the CC, like the CPI, is 




measuring both political and bureaucratic corruption. In short, the CC is very similar to the 
CPI, although, unlike the CPI, one of its representative sources focuses exclusively on 
corruption by bureaucrats, which means that the bias toward non-elected officials may be 
somewhat more significant compared to the CPI. In addition, CC uses fewer representative 
sources (five versus eight), which means that it is somewhat less likely to consist of 
representative sources regarding the extent of 'political' corruption than CPI (Hamilton and 
Hammer, 2018). 
In the literature, there are still two different approaches to the effects of corruption on 
an economy. They are illustrated by the wheel of economic growth, where corruption can be 
the "grease" or the "sand" for this wheel (Méon & Sekkat, 2005). This concept shows that 
corruption may have a positive or negative impact on economic growth, and it only considers 
the economic aspects of this phenomenon, ignoring ethical arguments. Many researchers have 
attempted to define the relationship between corruption and economic growth The exact 
channels through which corruption affects economic growth are not resolved empirically. 
However, the main channels used in researches include investment, human capital, and 
political instability (Mo, 2000; Mauro, 1995).   
Approaches and frameworks that investigating the relationship between corruption and 
economic growth are still developing and remain a relevant topic for research. Gründler and 
Potrafke (2019), in their recent paper, used CPI data for 175 countries over the period 2012-
2018 and re-examined the relationship between corruption and economic growth. The 
cumulative long-run effect of corruption on growth is that real GDP per capita declined by 
about 17% when the inverse CPI increased by one standard deviation. Authors claimed that 
the effect is particularly pronounced in autocracies and countries with low government 
effectiveness and rule of law, supporting the "weak form" of the "grease the wheels" 
hypothesis: affects to growth by reducing foreign direct investment and increasing inflation. 
The hypotheses about a non-linear relationship between corruption and economic growth using 
models estimated by the generalized method of moments (GMM) were empirically confirmed 
by Pluskota (2020) in her study. The author concludes parabolic linkage between those 
categories and provides exciting insights into the impact of corruption, where the maximum 
of a function of economic growth could be calculated in terms of the value of corruption. One 
result suggests that low levels of corruption can be beneficial to an economy. At the same time, 




Another study by Ahmad et al. (2012) provides a linear quadratic empirical relationship 
between corruption and economic growth. The authors used the same empirical approach of 
the generalized method of moments (GMM). Their estimation shows that a decrease in 
corruption raises the economic growth rate in an inverted U-shaped manner. Their result is 
robust to alternative specifications of the econometric relationship. The authors claimed that 
the empirical literature reporting a linear relationship between corruption and economic 
development does not differentiate between growth-enhancing and growth-reducing levels of 
corruption. Therefore, new approaches are needed to examine the relationship between the 
categories.  
Nonetheless, there are several studies in which the impact of corruption is not 
statistically significant (Huang, 2016), with a few showing that the existence of corruption can 
actually contribute to economic growth ("greasing the wheels" in inefficient regulatory 
framework) and, go deeper claiming that the costs incurred from measures taken by 
government action against corruption and bureaucracy are not always beneficial to economic 
growth (Tsanana et al, 2016; Huang, 2016). 
2.2. Problem of reliability of the governmental or international organizations data 
Because of its hidden nature, corruption and its effects are difficult to measure. The 
most significant criticisms leveled at such measurements in the international specific literature 
also highlight that, in most cases, the independence of the organizations undertaking the 
corruption measurements, the transparency of the data sources used, and the applied 
methodology are not ensured.  
Nemeth et al. (2019) identified numerous risks that affect the scientific reliability and 
validity of international indicators that measure corruption. The organizations conducting the 
survey cannot be considered independent. Numerous factors influence corruption perceptions 
in addition to corruption. Jahedi and Mendez (2014) acknowledged that economic and 
cognitive factors might distract the subjective indicators, and these may show a negative 
correlation with the objective data. However, according to them, this is not a sufficient reason 
for disregarding the data sources. Hawken and Munck (2009) analysed and tested the validity 
of data on corruption using the full range of data sets employed in corruption research. The 
authors showed that different classes of data sources on corruption indicators, a distinction 
based on who assesses the level of corruption in a country, are based on different standards for 




Moreover, they mention that the problem with the indicators is also simply adopted in CPI and 
the CCI indices. Systematic differences between indicators are disregarded in the selection of 
indicators used in these indices. 
Other researches claim the problem of investigating the impact of corruption in the 
countries where it is ample. For example, Shukhova and Nisnevich (2017), measured the 
validity of corruption indices in their work and proved that in many cases, the methodology 
used to construct the index is not accessible to the extent that would allow independent 
researcher validation to be conducted. Pelizzo et al. (2017) conducted some correlation 
analyses that raise questions about the validity and reliability of the estimated level of 
corruption using Kazakhstan as an example. The authors found that corruption levels estimated 
by the Corruption Perception Index, the World Governance Indicators, and the Global 
Competitiveness Index are weakly and insignificantly related to one another and relatively 
unstable over time. The authors explain why international measures of corruption fail to assess 
and track changes in corruption levels in Kazakhstan. They suggest that this anomaly can be 
explained by three different reasons, namely that the country is so different from other places, 
that methodologies that work elsewhere do not work in the internal context, that the methods 
used to estimate corruption levels are wrong, and that the information processed to estimate 
corruption levels in Kazakhstan is misleading.  
According to the challenge of determining whether the data is valid, researches tend to 
pit validation techniques against each other, rather than explain how to combine multiple 
approaches. One solution to that is Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) corruption index is a new 
approach to the conceptualization and measurement of corruption (McMann et al. 2016). It is 
co-hosted by the University of Gothenburg and University of Notre Dame. V-Dem aggregates 
corruption indicators using a two-stage approach: using item response theory (IRT) 
measurement model and Bayesian factor analysis to aggregate corruption measures (McMann 
et al. 2016, p.15).  
From the other perspective, the reliability problem applies to the measurement of 
official economic and financial statistics at the government level. Governments of all kinds 
have an incentive to exaggerate how well the economy is doing, on the basis of which 
manipulation of official economic statistics occurs. A strong democracy guarantees that 
opposition parties, the media, the judiciary, and the general public are free to scrutinize 




(Martinez, 2017). The execution of USSR officials responsible for the 1937 census after its 
unsatisfactory results serves as an extreme example (Merridale, 1996). A more recent example 
concerns Chinese Premier Li Keqiang's alleged acceptance of the unreliability of the country's 
official GDP estimates (Clark et al., 2017). Nevertheless, there is limited evidence on whether 
manipulation of growth figures is a common feature of modern authoritarian regimes and how 
this phenomenon is quantified. 
2.3.Use of satellite data as a proxy for economic growth 
A few years ago, scientists started looking for other approaches to undertake economic 
estimations. In addition to machine learning approaches to measuring challenging series such 
as corruption, some economists suggested the usefulness of an extraordinary proxy for 
economic activity: the amount of light that can be observed from outer space. For example, 
Henderson et al. (2012) used changes in "night lights" as a measure of economic growth. They 
showed that light growth is a convenient proxy for GDP growth in the long run and also tracks 
short-term growth fluctuations. Their estimates differ from the official data by up to three 
percentage points annually. Therefore, they prove that empirical analyses of growth using 
Lights no longer need to use countries as the unit of analysis.  
Other economists used the same approach to measure human well-being (Ghosh et al. 
2013), with the authors claiming that their estimates can be constructed as spatially 
disaggregated one-square-kilometer grids so that they can be aggregated to any desirable 
mapping unit. The alternative measure of the distribution of wealth across regions, called the 
Night Light Development Index (NLDI) (Elvidge et al., 2012), is often used in papers related 
to various economic estimators. It is an empirical measurement index of human development 
derived solely from nighttime satellite imagery and population density. 
Other researchers use the same approach for more specific estimations. For example, 
Rangel-Gonzalez and Llamosas-Rosas (2019) used satellite nightlights to measure economic 
activity in Mexico and discrepancies between estimated and official GDP to identify the 
unregistered economic activity. The proposed econometric specification in this paper takes 
into account the fact that the relationship between nightlights and economic activity varies by 
sector when estimating the correlation between luminosity and economic activity. Similarly, a 
research group from Romania (Kinga et al. 2020) measured inequality and determined the 
Night Light Inequality Index (NLII) at the national level, based on the county-level Night Light 




empirical evidence. The values of the NLII range from 0 to 10, with 0 indicating perfect 
equality and 10 indicating perfect inequality. 
In the most recent work, Jha and Talathi (2021) used the number of night lights per 
capita as a proxy for per capita income at the district level in India. They found that modern 
districts that were historically under direct British rule had 39.47% less night lights per capita 
compared to modern districts that were historically under indirect British rule. When looking 
at the growth pattern using satellite data from 1993 to 2013, directly ruled districts had a 1.84% 
lower annual growth rate than indirectly ruled districts. They mention that directly ruled 
districts were converging at a rate of 2% per year while indirectly ruled districts were 
converging at a rate of 5.7% per year (areas that were initially less developed were growing 
faster). All the estimates for different activities prove that satellite data can be used as an 
efficient proxy for empirical analysis. In discovering the relationship between corruption and 
economic growth using night lights data, it is also worth noting that electricity is essential for 
social and economic development. In the paper by Min (2015), electricity is likened to the 
"lifeblood of the modern economy" as most of the economic activities we see in the world 
today depend on a steady supply of electricity and a stable system to distribute it. Boräng et al. 
(2016) explained that the effect of democratic experience on electrification is indeed dependent 
on the level of corruption in the public administration. Democratic history is associated with a 
lower proportion of the population living in unlit areas only if a country has been able to reduce 
corruption to a certain level. In contexts with widespread corruption, a long experience with 
democracy has been shown to have no effect on the provision of electricity to the population.  
Martinez (2017) discovered the manipulation of GDP growth statistics in non-
democracies by comparing self-reported GDP figures with night-light data. He showed that 
the night-light elasticity of GDP is systematically larger in more authoritarian regimes. This 
autocracy gradient in elasticity is not explained by possible differences in a large set of country 
characteristics, including economic structure, urbanization, state capacity, or level of 
development. The gradient is larger when countries have a stronger incentive to exaggerate 
economic performance or when the institutions that constrain the manipulation of official 
statistics are weaker.  
The author asserts that the magnitude of this manipulation is substantial. His estimates 
show that the most authoritarian regimes inflate annual GDP growth rates by a factor of 1.15-




manipulation changes the understanding of relative economic performance at the turn of the 
XXI century and downplays the apparent economic success of countries with non-democratic 
forms of government. Moreover, his findings are a warning sign for scholars, policymakers, 
and other consumers of official economic statistics. They provide an incentive for the 
development and use of robust measures of economic activity and for the enforcement of 
international transparency standards such as the IMF's Dissemination Standards Bulletin 
Board (DSBB) (Martinez, 2017 p.28). 
3. Data description  
Empirical analysis makes use of datasets which are obtained from different sources.  
First of all, night lights data from the National Geophysical Data Center (NGDC) of 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The annual data from 1995 
to 2013 (time series length of 19 years) has been used. This time interval was chosen because 
the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP) data collected by US Air Force 
Weather Agency is only available until 2014 and it is easier to undertake the analysis due to 
required computing power comparing to Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) 
data that is available for next years. Each satellite-year dataset is a grid in .tar format.  reporting 
the intensity of lights as a six-bit digital number, for every 30 arc-second output pixel 
(approximately 0.86 square kilometers at the equator) between 65 degrees south and 75 
degrees’ north latitude (National Geophysical Data Center, 2010). Figure 1 summarizes the 
processing of the data. For the empirical estimations approximately 50 GB of the satellite data 
has been used. To get the proxy for economic activity author used the replication files form 
the code of the paper “Measuring Economic Growth from Outer Space” by Henderson et al. 
(2012) and applied additional R packages such as “lattice”, “dplyr”, “pdynmc”, “plm” etc. for 





Figure 1. Graphical Description of Data Processing 
Source: Rangel-Gonzaleza and Llamosas-Rosas (2019) 
 
Because of the computational difficulties of getting large amount of the data from 
satellite, it was decided to conduct the estimations using a sample of a limited number of 
countries. Geographical coverage of analysis will be the Post-Soviet countries (former Soviet 
Union countries) except Russia due to its large area and high regional variation in terms of 
economic development. This region is highly relevant for studying corruption and its 
consequences on economy for several reasons. First, according to corruption indices from 
Transparency International, corruption has been a widespread problem in this group of 
countries. Second, according to The Quality of Government ranking (Charron et al., 2019), 
these countries have low level of institutional quality such as rule of law, accountability and 
transparency. Considering the legacy of a totalitarian past, the strategically important 
geographical location, and the various cultural and political determinants of corruption this 
sample of countries is interesting to study. Due to lack of these certain institutional setting, 
country officials may not reveal accurate statistics about macroeconomy and business 
environment. Hence, these conditions make these countries suitable laboratory for empirical 
analysis of   the relationship between corruption and economic growth.  For the lights-output 
proxy I obtained panel data of 14 countries for 19 years’ timeframe.    
Appendix A shows main variables for 14 countries that have been obtained using 
abovementioned data and replication files. Description of the lights data can be found in 




For empirical estimations, I included several independent variables which are obtained 
by using various datasets such as Transparency International, World Bank, IMF and V-DEM 
(Varieties of Democracy) datasets. Primary independent variable for proxying corruption 
obtained from Corruption Perception Index (CPI, from Transparency International) and V-
DEM corruption index. CPI measure is available starting from 1995 and old indices were 
multiplied by 10 to get the same estimation value over the time. V-DEM corruption index is 
available for all years and was multiplied by and subtracted from 100 to get the same 
estimation value as the CPI measure: from 0 to 100 and higher index level indicates lower 
corruption level of a country.  
Scholars appear to agree on different sets of macroeconomic indicators to be used for 
investigating the impact of corruption on economic growth. For example, Mo (2001) and 
Pelligrini and Gerlagh (2004) used for their analysis control variables such as government 
expenditures, investment-output ratio, and population growth rate to analyze the impact of 
corruption on growth. I also include electricity consumption and trade openness ratio and 
substitute the GDP with my lights-output proxy as independent variable. Primary information 
about the variables is presented in Appendix B. 
 
4. Methodology and empirical estimations 
4.1. Generating lights-output proxy 
Night light satellite data have been already used by past studies as a proxy for economic 
activity. For example, in regions for which no GDP data are available, at the sub-national level, 
or for regions in which GDP measurement is of poor quality, for example in some developing 
countries as in the paper by Henderson et al. (2012). 
This proxy gives the data on the regions and their intensity of night lights. Specifically, 
I examine to what extent changes in the intensity of night lights are correlated with local 
economic growth. As, for example, in the paper by Ishizawa et al. (2016) for the Central 
America region. I used the same econometric approach to evaluate the relationship between 
artificial night lights and real GDP over time as in paper by Chen and Nordhaus (2010). The 
basic assumption is that there are measures on nightlights intensity and standard output for 
each grid cell (or country), and that these are measured with error. The analysis was conducted 
at the country level in both of the abovementioned papers. For that the nightlights grid data 




separately. Figure 2 illustrates the difference between number of observed night lights for 
Estonia in 1992 and 2013. Comparative illustrations for all 14 countries are in Appendix E. 
 
 
Figure 2. Comparison of night light in Estonia 
Source: author’s own compilation. 
 
The variable y is the logarithm of the true output (GDP), m is the logarithm of the night 
lights intensity (number of nightlights observed divided by area), and ε and ξ are the 
measurement errors for standard output and intensity, respectively. In addition, I assume a 
structural relationship between intensity of nightlights and true output as in Ishizawa et al. 
(2016), with a coefficient of β (elasticity of nightlights to true output) and an error term u. 
There are measurements of each variable in one country i over the year t, an asterisk denotes 
the true value: 
𝑦𝑖 =  𝑦𝑖
∗ + 𝜀𝑖 (1) 
𝑚𝑖 =  𝑚𝑖
∗ + 𝜉𝑖 (2) 
𝑚𝑖 =  𝛽𝑦𝑖
∗ + 𝑢𝑖 (3) 
Equations (1) and (2) are the error processes for output and nightlights intensity, 
respectively. Equation (3) is the data-generating process for intensity of nightlights as a 
function of true output. Using this equations, lights-output proxy from these relationships is 
obtained as follows:  





where 𝑍𝑖 is the log of lights-output proxy and β is the consistently estimated coefficient 
from the equation (3). I observe the long-term growth (time series length of 18 years), therefore 
β coefficients are high and significant. The results of estimation are in the Appendix D. 
For example, model predictions using lights-output proxy compared to observed GDP 
growth in case of Georgia are in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3. Comparison of growth lights-output proxy Z and GDP in Georgia (1995-2013) 
Source: author’s own compilation. 
 
The figure shows the similarity of the growth in both GDP per capita and Z, but the 
growth of the Z proxy is sharper and more volatile comparing to GDP growth. This proxy will 
be used as an independent variable for estimating a dynamic panel data model in next section.  
4.2. Estimating the effect of corruption on economic growth 
The violation of exogeneity assumption makes OLS estimators inconsistent and creates 
the problem of endogeneity. A potential endogeneity problem arises due to reverse causality 
e.g. economic growth may affect corruption levels. However, the direction of this effect is 
unclear. Higher economic growth may increase the availability of rents, making corruption 
more profitable, but it also increases the amount of resources that can be devoted to controlling 
corruption. In both cases, corruption would be correlated with the error term in the random 
effects model (REM) and the estimates would be biased. If economic growth increases 




corruption would be biased upward (downward). To overcome this difficulty, several authors 
in the past have included an instrumental variable and performed a two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) regression. In theory, this is a perfectly valid procedure. In practice, however, it is very 
difficult to find a valid instrument. The two-dimensionality of the panel data creates two types 
of errors that affect the performance of the estimates. One relates to cross-sectional 
observations and the other to time-series observations (e.g., country-specific error may 
overstate the estimates in our sample). Apart from these errors, the inclusion of lagged 
dependent variable also worsens the problem of serial correlation; to overcome the problem of 
bias and endogeneity, I use the generalized method of moments (GMM) in this study, apart 
from REM as in Ahmad et al. (2012), Swaleheen (2011), Pluskota (2020) and others. 
I estimate a dynamic panel data model. To specify my structural econometric model, 
first extend the traditional cross section model into a panel data model as follows: 
𝑍𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1CORR𝑖,𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗X𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡 (5) 
where 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 is the dependent variable - log of intensity-output proxy, CORR is the 
explanatory variable - corruption index: CPI or V-DEM. X𝑖𝑗𝑡 is a column vector of exogenous 
control variables and includes: government expenditures to GDP ratio (EXGDP), FDI to GDP 
ratio (FDIGDP), export plus import to GDP ratio (OPENNESS), kilowatt hour per capita 
consumption (KWHPC) and population growth rate (POPGR). Primary information about this 
variable and their descriptive statistics with correlation matrix can be found in Appendix B 
and Appendix C respectively.    
Subscript 𝑖 is used to present the country (𝑖 = 1, 2,…...,n), 𝑗 for control variables ( 𝑗 = 
1, 2,…., m) and t is used for time (𝑡 = 1, 2,…..,T), and 𝜇 is an error term. The focus of the 
study is on the impact of corruption on economic growth, so α1 is the coefficient of main 
interest. As both CPI and V-DEM corruption indices are interpreted so that higher value of 
them indicates lower corruption level in a country, so I expect that the positive sign (𝛼1˂ 0) 
supports the hypothesis that corruption ‘greases the wheels’; whereas negative sign of the 
coefficient of corruption (𝛼1˃ 0) implies that corruption ‘sands the wheels’.  
For my panel, I expect the marginal effect of corruption on growth to change as the 
incidence of corruption increases. To test for this nonlinearity, I add squared corruption 




level of incidence corruption is more decentralized and growth-reducing. A positive sign 
indicates that the relationship between corruption and its effect on growth is low.  
Arellano and Bond (1991) present a method (AB first difference GMM method) 
suitable for estimating this dynamic model for a panel of countries whose data are available for 
a short period (N is large and T is small). Applying the definition of a growth rate of the 
intensity-output proxy (𝑍𝑖,𝑡 = log 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 −  log 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1) and rearranging terms and adding squared 
corruption (CORR2) as an explanatory variable, the estimating equation in the AB first 
difference GMM method is the structural equation in first difference:  
log 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 −  log 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝑦2(log 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 − log 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−2) +  𝑦3(𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1)
+  𝑦3(𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑖,𝑡
2 − 𝐶𝑂𝑅𝑅𝑖,𝑡−1
2 ) +  𝛽𝑗(𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 − 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡−1) + (𝜀𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜀𝑖,𝑡−1) 
 
With  eliminated, the AB method uses internal instruments for each of the first 
differenced explanatory variables. For exogenous explanatory variables, the first differenced 
term (𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 − 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡−1) is instrumented by itself. In the case independent variable, (log 𝑍𝑖,𝑡 −
 log 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−2) can be instrumented by log 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−2 under the assumption that 𝐸[log 𝑍𝑖,𝑡−𝑆, (𝜀𝑖,𝑡 −
𝜀𝑖,𝑡−𝑆)] = 0 for 𝑆 > 2; 𝑡 = 3, . . . , i.e., that current lights-output proxy are uncorrected with the 
level of corruption (and other endogenous variables) two periods ago.  
 
4.3. Empirical results 
Table 1 below represents estimation results of the difference GMM model. Table 
includes columns with lagged natural logarithm of the independent variable (lights-output 
proxy Z), explanatory variable CORR and the lists of exogenous explanatory variables and 
control variables; parameter estimates of the model and their significance. In the end of the 
table various tests of the estimated models are presented. Column 1 and column 2 resulting 
models with lights-output proxy Z as independent variable. In the last column (3) the same 







Table 1. Difference GMM (Arellano–Bond first difference GMM) estimation results 
using CPI 
 (1) (2)  (3) 
Lagged lnZ   0.5429   (***) 0.0113   
Lagged lnGDPPC      0.6543  (***) 
CPI 0.0142   (***) 0.0432 (***)  0.0071 (**) 
CPI2  -0.0003 (**)   
FDIGDP 0.0076 0.0061  0.0075 
EXGDP -0.0115  (*) -0.0149 (*)  -0.0014 
OPENNESS -0.0023 0.0038  0.0024(*) 
POPGR 0.0364   (*) -0.008  0.0124(**) 
KWHPC 0.0001 0.0005  0.0001 
Wald test(p-value) 0.0 0.0  0.0 
J-statistic (p-value) 0.0425 0.1994  0.0347 
H0:AR(1) is absent  
(p-value) 
0.04038 0.0112  0.0389 
H0:AR(2) is absent  
(p-value) 
0.2394 0.3651  0.4574 
No. of observations  266 266  266 
No. of countries  14 14  14 
The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively 
Source: author’s calculations 
First model passes the test for the absence of the AR-2 process in the differenced error 
term, J-statistic and the Wald tests. Results with estimation using CPI index in the GMM 
specification show even higher coefficient and significance at 1%. Corruption has a negative 
effect on my lights-output proxy. A one-standard-deviation increase (an improvement) in the 
CPI index raises the natural log of Z (Output) by 0.168% (obtained by multiplying 0.0142, the 
slope coefficient, by 12.704, the standard deviation of the CPI index in Table 3). That mean 
that output Z increase on average by 6.8% if we increase our CPI index on approximately 12 
positions, i.e. from the level of the CPI of Tajikistan to the level of Moldova (Table 4). 
Comparing to the model with GDP per capita as independent variable (column 3), where the 





I reject no autocorrelation of order 1 and cannot reject no autocorrelation of order 2. 
There is evidence that the Arellano–Bond model assumptions are satisfied. I re-estimated the 
GMM system model in Table 1 column 2 by adding the coefficient on squared corruption - 
CPI2 - to check the sign of the coefficient. The results are reported in column 2. This model 
passes the test for the absence of the AR-2 process in the differenced error term and the Wald 
test. The J-statistic is higher because the model has been extended, but since this test for over 
identifying restrictions and this model has a p-value of 0.1994, which is not far from 0, I assume 
that over identifying restrictions are consistent in this case. When squared corruption is added 
as an explanatory variable, the coefficient on corruption is significantly larger (compare 
column 1 with column 2). The estimated effect of corruption in that case has higher value and 
statistically significant: a one-standard-deviation increase (an improvement) in the CPI index 
raises the natural log of Z by 0.548% (Output Z increase on 54.8% with increase of CPI on 
average 12-13 points).  
 
4.4. Robustness check 
Table 2 below represents estimation results of the difference GMM model but using V-
DEM corruption index instead of CPI to see the impact of corruption on economic growth. 
Column 1 and column 2 resulting models with lights-output proxy Z as independent variable, 
column 3 – GDP per capita.  
Table 2. Difference GMM (Arellano–Bond first difference GMM) estimation results 
using V-DEM index 
 (1) (2)  (3) 
Lagged lnZ   0.7390  (***) 0.0037   
Lagged lnGDPPC      0.7458(***) 
VDEM 0.0021   (***) 0.0262(**)  0.0012(*) 
VDEM2  -0.0002(*)   
FDIGDP 0.0051  0.005  0.0021 
EXGDP -0.0155    (**) -0.0116(*)  -0.0014 
OPENNESS -0.0012    -0.0013  0.0124(**) 
POPGR -0.0950  0.0128  -0.0214(**) 
KWHPC 0.0003    0.0008  0.0001 
Wald test(p-value) 0.0 0.0  0.0 
J-statistic (p-value) 0.0425 0.1994  0.0056 
H0:AR(1) is absent  
(p-value) 




H0:AR(2) is absent  
(p-value) 
0.2394 0.3651  0.2714 
No. of observations  266 266  266 
No. of countries  14 14  14 
The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively 
Source: author’s calculations 
 
The result using V-DEM index shows smaller coefficients for corruption. However 
high significance at 1% level is still observed.  A one-standard-deviation increase (an 
improvement) in the VDEM index raises the natural log of Z (Output) only by 0.067% 
(obtained by multiplying 0.0020874, the slope coefficient, by 31.708, the standard deviation of 
the V-DEM index). That mean that increase of the V-DEM index by 31-32 points tends to 
cause only to 6.7% increase in output Z. The CORR2 , using VDEM index  (in column 2) is 
statistically significant and negative in sign as expected: a one-standard-deviation increase (an 
improvement) in the V-DEM index raises the natural log of Z by 0.781% (Output Z increase 
on 78.1% with increase of V-DEM on average 31-32 points).  
Column 3 parameter estimates displays the impact of increase in V-DEM index on 30 
points increase of GDP per capita only by 3.8 %. However, the coefficient on corruption is 




From results above the corruption has an ample effect on economic growth and this 
effect is negative. Re-estimated models with CORR2 supports finding that the effect of 
corruption on the lights-intensity proxy is negative and, furthermore, that the marginal effect 
of a change in the level of corruption Z declines with an increase in level. The coefficient for 
squared corruption is significant when measured by CPI (1% significance) and V-DEM index 
(5% significance). However, the sign for squared corruption is negative in all specifications, 
rejecting hypothesis based on Shleifer and Vishny (1993) that corruption is more growth 
reducing at higher levels because of how corruption is organized and supporting the hypothesis 
by Swaleheen (2011) that with regard to how the effect of corruption changes with its level 
(measured by squared corruption), it supports that the impact is changing with the incidence 




of countries, the effect of a change in the corruption can be calculated including CORR2 as an 
explanatory variable in equation 5 and taking derivative: 
𝜕𝑙𝑛𝑍
𝜕𝐶𝑃𝐼
= 0.0432 − 2 × 0.0003 × 𝐶𝑃𝐼  (7) 
Equation (7) shows that when the level of corruption is allowed to vary in the sample 
of my countries, corruption is not growth reducing at all levels. When CPI reaches 72, 
corruption has no effect on growth at the margin. Beyond this level, corruption is actually 
growth reducing. At its highest incidence in my sample, i.e., in the case of Turkmenistan which 
has the lowest CPI at 17, corruption is greatly growth reducing. 
The figure 4 illustrates positive slope of the parabolic relationship between corruption 
and economic growth and provides the growth maximizing level of corruption, which is 72 
according to GMM estimations using CPI measure:  
 
 
Figure 4. Growth maximizing level of corruption 
Source: compiled by author 
 
The models that used output proxy Z demonstrated higher impact of corruption on 
economic growth compared to models using GDP measure, that can be explained by evidence 
on data reliability, overestimation of the GDP, governmental accounting differences etc. For 




growth rates on average by a factor of 1.15-1.3 %. and the economic success of non-
democracies in recent years has been manipulation. Sample of my countries mainly includes 
such countries. Table 4 reports measured growth rates of lights-output proxy, GDP per capita 
and their difference. 
Table 3. Comparison of output growth rates 
Country CPI (2013) 
Z 
growth rate 
GDP per capita 
growth rate 
Δgr 
Lithuania 57 8.13 4.46 -3.67 
Estonia 68 6.95 4.50 -2.44 
Latvia 53 6.55 4.61 -1.94 
Ukraine 25 2.75 1.57 -1.18 
Moldova 35 4.17 3.02 -1.15 
Georgia 49 6.92 5.96 -0.96 
Armenia 36 7.60 6.89 -0.71 
Belarus 31 4.95 5.47 0.52 
Kyrgyzstan 24 4.29 5.58 1.29 
Kazakhstan 26 2.85 4.28 1.43 
Tajikistan 22 2.61 4.93 2.32 
Turkmenistan 17 4.47 6.90 2.43 
Uzbekistan 17 2.52 5.77 3.25 
Azerbaijan 28 5.33 9.56 4.24 
Source: compiled by author. 
From the table 3, we can compare how correlated the level of corruption and the 
difference between growth rates are. In my sample, Baltic trio including Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania are post-soviet countries with highest CPI and negative difference between actual 
GDP growth rate and generated lights-output proxy Z, while at the same time, at the bottom 
of the table are the countries with the lowest level of the CPI and at the same time with the 
largest difference in growth rates. Correlation between the differences in growth rates and CPI 
measure is -0.821, that proves high relationship between them.  
When we look at the positive difference values between growth rates in the final 
column, these values belong to the countries which have authoritarian government style with 
very weak institutional setting. This could be attributed to the several factors. First, these less 
democratic countries might have inflated their economic growth rates since availability of 
public interest data is highly dependent on the regime type and authoritarian regimes tend to 
be less transparent than democratic ones (Hollyer et al., 2011). Political role of information is 
huge in authoritarian regimes, thus, there is a high likelihood of manipulation of 




2016). As a result, potentially manipulated macroeconomic statistical indicators would not 
show themselves in reality as concrete and physical developments. Second, even if the money 
is spent for specific investments, this may not be fully realised due to widespread corruption 
(Lehne et al., 2018). Indeed, according to CPI reported in Table 4, these countries have very 
low corruption rating. Eventually, taxpayers’ money would disappear and end up in the corrupt 
hands, and hence, promised developments may not take place as it was caught (or not 
observed) in night lights data.  
 
5. Conclusion 
In this thesis I presented evidence that corruption has a direct effect on growth, that 
effect is negative and non-linear. To judge the relative importance of the effect of corruption, 
we now can compare effects of a one standard deviation change in the explanatory variables 
(CPI or V-DEM index) on both the growth rate of the generated lights-output proxy and the 
growth rate of real GDP per capita. Models with CPI results that output Z increase on average 
by 6.8% if we increase our CPI index on approximately 12 positions, i.e. from the level of the 
CPI of Tajikistan to the level of Moldova. Comparing to the model with GDP per capita as 
independent variable the same increase in CPI level tends to increase of the GDP per capita on 
9%. That can be explained by evidence on data reliability, manipulation of macroeconomic 
statistics and regime type of a country. 
I re-estimated the GMM system model by adding squared indices to check for the sign 
of the coefficient. With the negative sign, the model proves that the effect of corruption is 
parabolic and that the marginal effect of a change in the level of corruption on the growth rate 
declines with a decrease in corruption (increase in the level of corruption index). All models 
pass the tests for the absence of AR-2 process in the differenced error term, Wald and the 
Sargan–Hansen J tests. Models estimation using V-DEM index of corruption proves that 
impact of corruption is robust.  
The evidence from this study demonstrates the statistical importance of corruption and 
shows the possibilities of studying this phenomenon for subsequent research using updated 
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Table of lights, 2013 
Country 
Mean number of 
observations per 
pixel 
Sum of the 
light values 
(millions) 




Armenia 534 141,913 81 29,690 
Azerbaijan 567 447,346 34 86,235 
Belarus 257 1,371,270 19 207,069 
Estonia 679 429,876 59 45,489 
Georgia 630 222,266 70 69,844 
Kazakhstan 763 2,851,084 9 2,730,536 
Kyrgyzstan 527 288,682 115 198,649 
Latvia  202 313,518 12 64,710 
Lithuania 364 423,037 30 65,016 
Moldova 1966 186,683 164 33,907 
Tajikistan 268 181,085 55 142,113 
Turkmenistan 321 684,509 67 489,593 
Ukraine 1342 3,338,343 140 601,362 
Uzbekistan 731 1,139,535 117 447,555 














Main information about the data  
Code Variable Description 
sumlights Sum of the light values  
Sum of the light values in area (in 
millions) 
meanobsperpix 
Mean number of observations 
per pixel 
Mean number of observations per pixel 
that went into the aggregated image for a 
time period in a given area 
area Area  
Area of a region captured using a shape 
file of an area 
meanlights  Mean number of the lights Mean of the light values in a given area 
lightsarea Intensity of light on an area 
Intensity of light on an area as sum of 






Z Lights-output proxy 
Generated lights-output proxy measure of 
economic activity 
GDPPC 
Gross Domestic Product per 
capita 




Corruption Perception Index 
Corruption Perception Index, multiplied 
by 10 for all old format indices to get the 
same estimation value. 
VDEM V-DEM Corruption Index 
V-DEM Corruption Index measure, 
multiplied by and subtracted from 100 to 
get the same estimation value as CPI. 
From 0 to 100 (higher value indicates 
lower corruption presence) 
EXGDP 
Government expenditures to 
GDP  
Government expenditures to GDP ratio 
FDIGDP FDI to GDP Foreign direct investments to GDP ratio 
OPENNESS 
Import plus export to GDP 
ratio 
Openness of the economy ratio: import 
plus export to GDP ratio 
KWHPC Kilowatt hour per capita 
Kilowatt hour per capita consumption in a 
country 
POPGR Population growth rate Population growth rate of a country 
  Source: author’s own compilation   
APPENDIX C 
Descriptive statistics and correlation for selected variables 
  ln(Z) ln(GDPPC) CPI VDEM EXGDP FDIGDP OPENNESS KWHPC POPGR 
Average 2.722 23.116 31 35 15.972 6.124 99.795 2617.402 0.093 
Median 2.81 23.125 26 17 16.608 4.655 94.904 2250.321 -0.232 
Maximum 3.466 26.19 68 96 32.014 55.076 181.59 6689.368 2.823 
Minimum 1.782 20.573 15 4 5.941 -0.963 36.619 1050.244 -3.758 
Standard  
deviation 
0.323 1.296 12.704 31.789 4.815 6.544 29.585 1147.985 1.231 
Correlation                   
  ln(Z) ln(GDPPC) CPI VDEM EXGDP FDIGDP OPENNESS KWHPC POPGR 
ln(Z) 1   - - - - - - - 
ln(GDPPC) 0.04 1 - - - - - - - 
CPI 0.46 0.02 1 - - - - - - 
VDEM 0.49 0.15 0.85 1 - - - - - 
EXGDP 0.78 0.03 0.46 0.47 1 - - - - 
FDIGDP -0.28 -0.01 -0.07 -0.11 -0.29 1 - - - 
OPENNESS 0.25 -0.1 0.45 0.36 0.27 0.06 1 - - 
KWHPC 0.23 0.52 0.61 0.52 0.22 0.06 0.45 1 - 
POPGR -0.27 -0.08 -0.57 -0.53 -0.26 0.11 -0.04 -0.24 1 







Generating lights-output proxy results 
 β Z 𝑅2 (within country) 
Armenia 0.5449 (***) 25.92 0.8908 
Azerbaijan 0.1646(**) 31.28 0.4542 
Belarus 0.3094(***) 46.64 0.2997 
Estonia 0.2441(**) 94.76 0.2819 
Georgia 0.6729 (***) 4.78 0.8529 
Kazakhstan 0.4734(*) 5.76 0.3954 
Kyrgyzstan 0.1245(**) 8.65 0.4875 
Latvia 0.2289 (**) 35.08 0.3059 
Lithuania 0.3145(**) 84.62 0.3458 
Moldova 0.6454 (***) 42.57 0.6847 
Tajikistan 0.2456 (**) 8.19 0.3498 
Turkmenistan 0.3456 (*) 8.55 0.3458 
Ukraine 0.3478(*) 43.71 0.2587 
Uzbekistan 0.5749(**) 19.18 0.3145 
Note: Sample of 14 countries from 1995 to 2013 
The asterisks ***, **, and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% level of significance, respectively 






































Korruptsioon ja majanduskasv: uue tõendid satelliidiandmetes  
Danyl Denysenko 
Korruptsiooni mõju majanduskasvule uurinud kirjandus on tuginenud ametliku 
statistika poolt avaldatavatele makroökonoomilistele indikaatoritele, mis võivad olla 
mõjutatud valitsusepoolsetest manipuleerimistest. Käesoleva magistritöö eesmärgiks on 
uurida satelliitide abil kogutud öötulede andmete kasutusvõimalusi uurimaks seoseid 
korruptsiooni ja majanduskasvu vahel post-Sovietlikes riikides perioodil 1995-2013. 
Empiirilises analüüsis kasutatakse erinevaid andmestikke: USA Rahvusliku Geofüüsikalise 
Andmekeskuse öötulede andmete alusel genereeritud kogutoodangu lähend; korruptsiooni 
taseme mõõtmiseks Transparency International korruptsiooni tajumise indeks ning 
Demokraatia Mitmekesisuse Andmestiku (Varieties of Democracy Dataset) V-Dem 
korruptsiooni indeks. Üldistatud momentide meetodi hindamine 14 riigi paneelandmete abil 
näitas, et korruptsioonil on oluline mõju nii öise valgustuse andmete alusel tuletatud 
kogutoodangu lähendi kui ka per capita SKP kasvule. Vastav seos on samas mittelineaarne ja 
öötulede andmete alusel tuletatud kogutoodangu lähendi kasutamisel oli korruptsioonil suurem 
mõju majanduskasvule võrreldes traditsioonilise SKP mõõdiku kasutamisega. Viimast 
tulemust võiks selgitada andmete usaldusväärsuse küsimustega osades analüüsi kaasatud 
riikides, makroökonoomiliste statistika manipuleerimisega ja eri riikide poliitilise režiimi 
tüüpidega. 
Võtmesõnad: öötulede andmed, korruptsioon, majanduskasv, post-Sovietlikud riigid, 
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